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Abstract 
It has been commonly observed that tropical countries typically suffer from 
intense corruption and underdevelopment. I offer an explanation for this long-
standing disparity across the world based on variation in the intensity of 
ultraviolet radiation (UV-R). The central idea of this paper holds that UV-R is 
positively associated with the (historical) prevalence of eye diseases, which 
significantly shortens work-life expectancy as a skilled worker. This arguably 
shapes the global pattern of corrupt practices. Interestingly, this finding appears 
to be strong and insensitive to accounting for different theories explaining 
differences in corruption levels across the globe. Further analyses using 
individual-level data taken from the World Values Survey and provincial level 
data for China lend strong credence to the cross-country evidence.    
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The pattern of comparative prosperity across the world is arguably one of the most debated 
topics in mainstream economics. As well as large and persistent disparities in wealth, there is 
also considerable variation in the perceived level of corruption across the globe (Figure 1). 
Countries located further away from the equator, in particular, enjoy a more transparent 
institutional environment. By contrast, corruption is more pervasive in societies located closer 
to the equator. While these patterns of inequality are well known for many decades or so, a 
systematic empirical analysis remains relatively scant.  
A recent study by Andersen et al. (2016) attends to this line of inquiry, and finds that the 
intensity of ultraviolet radiation (UV-R), which is highly correlated with latitude, offers an 
explanation for the global income inequality. This novel idea rests upon the premise that UV-
R shortens work-life expectancy as a skilled worker, thus shaping economic prosperity via 
affecting the timing of fertility transition. This piece of work, however, leaves it open to debate 
whether UV-R helps explain why some regions are much more corrupt than others. 
It is commonly presumed that corrupt practices create unfavourable conditions for 
economic growth and development (e.g., Mauro, 1995;  Aidt, 2003;  Svensson, 2005;  Glaeser 
& Saks, 2006;  Ahlin & Bose, 2007;  Aidt et al., 2008;  Aidt, 2009;  Dimant & Tosato, 2018). 
The annual cost associated with corrupt acts in the form of bribes and stolen money amounts 
to 2.6 trillion USD or five percent of the global GDP (OECD, 2013). Thus, corruption is 
highlighted as one of the most serious impediments to achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals by 2030. To the extent that corruption is a global concern and its prevalence is distributed 
unequally across countries, we need to understand the underlying causes of corrupt activities. 
A wealth of literature explores determinants of corruption, using cross-country data. This 
helps advance our understanding of the perennial question discussed above and contributes to 
forming corruption-related policies. The worldwide distribution of corruption, for instance, is 
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attributable to the share of women in parliament (Swamy et al., 2001), democracy (Treisman, 
2000), the size of government (Goel & Nelson, 1998), bureaucracy and regulations (Goel & 
Nelson, 2010), to name but a few.1 A salient pitfall of these studies mainly stems from 
endogeneity concerns, making it difficult to draw valid statistical inference. Establishing 
causality, therefore, requires finding an instrumental variable that satisfies the exclusion 
restriction, which is challenging. Furthermore, these “proximate” factors are generally 
interrelated with and jointly determined by the level of corruption. For this reason, they offer 
an inadequate understanding of the deep roots of corrupt practices.2 Aidt (2003) also 
emphasizes that corruption appears to be a persistent feature of human societies. This 
necessitates examining the deep roots of corrupt behaviour that help explain the long-lasting 
differences in corruption levels across the world more adequately. 
Motivated by the above issues, several studies endeavour to examine the pattern of 
corruption from a (historical) fundamental determinant perspective. An influential viewpoint 
asserts that common-law countries have less corruption compared with civil-law counterparts 
(La Porta et al., 1999;  Treisman, 2000;  Swamy et al., 2001). Another hypothesis contends that 
communist legacy matters for today’s corruption (La Porta et al., 1999;  Paldam, 2002;  Uberti, 
2018). Specifically, corrupt practices are more prevalent in former socialist and transitional 
economies. Furthermore, Treisman (2000) and Dincer (2008) argue that ethnolinguistic 
diversity exerts a statistically significant influence on the incidence of corruption. Other studies 
attribute corrupt practices to culture and religion (La Porta et al., 1999;  Treisman, 2000;  
Paldam, 2001, 2002). It is plausible that these variables may provide exogenous sources of 
                                                          
1
 Dimant and Tosato (2018) provide an excellent review of causes and effects of corruption.  
2
 For example, if corrupt activities are attributable to cross-country differences in gender inequality, democratic 
institutions and inefficient bureaucracy, what further explain the global variation in these factors? This motivates 
understanding the origins of corrupt behaviour because curbing corruption requires treating the disease not just 
its symptoms.  
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variation in corruption levels because they were predetermined in history. For this reason, 
reverse causality is unlikely to exist, thus mitigating the potential endogeneity bias.  
Importantly, the long-lasting observation that corruption appears to be more widespread 
when one moves more closely to the equator remains largely unexplored in the current 
literature. Even if we account for existing hypotheses, temperate countries (e.g., Denmark, New 
Zealand, and Finland) rank persistently high among the least corrupt economies in the world. 
By contrast, tropical regions (e.g., South Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen) suffer from much higher 
levels of corruption. Thus, it is still open to debate whether geographic endowments exert any 
causal effect on the prevalence of corruption across the world. Further, if geography matters 
for corrupt activities, what are the mechanisms behind this relationship? These questions are 
essential to advance our understanding of the origins of corruption, which is relevant for 
forming policies to eliminate corrupt behaviour.   
This study proposes a novel hypothesis that the intensity of UV-R, which is perhaps the 
strongest correlate of latitude, matters for cross-country differences in corruption levels. I posit 
that there exists a positive reduced-form link between UV-R and the pervasiveness of corrupt 
practices. In particular, high UV-R countries face a permanent threat of contracting eye 
diseases that shortens the duration of work-life expectancy as a skilled worker (Andersen et al., 
2016). I argue later that this channel of influence helps explain the uneven distribution of 
corruption across the globe. As far as I am aware, there is no study linking geographic 
endowments, particularly UV-R, and corruption levels. 
To test the above proposition, I estimate cross-sectional models with data for up to 139 
countries. Results provide strong empirical support for the reduced-form relationship between 
UV-R and corruption levels. To reduce the potential omitted variable bias, I allow for a number 
of confounding factors to enter the baseline regression, following the existing long-run 
comparative development literature. Furthermore, the baseline findings remain largely 
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insensitive to performing a series of robustness tests. I also find evidence supporting the disease 
channel that helps explain the reduced-form link between UV-R and corruption behaviour in a 
cross-country analysis. Further evidence using individual-level and within-country data also 
lends strong credence to the cross-country evidence. 
This paper relates to several lines of inquiry. Foremost, it contributes to a strand of 
literature documenting that geographic endowments lie at the roots of long-term comparative 
prosperity across countries (Gallup et al., 1999;  Sachs, 2003;  Andersen et al., 2016). While 
existing studies mostly focus on the effect of geography on income levels, little is known about 
the extent to which geographic conditions help shape the widespread presence of corruption. 
My findings advance our understanding of the persistent effect of geography on the global 
pattern of development. This study also intersects with macro-level research examining the 
influence of mortality and morbidity on growth and development (Gallup & Sachs, 2001;  
Acemoglu & Johnson, 2007;  Ashraf et al., 2008;  Aghion et al., 2011;  Cervellati & Sunde, 
2011;  Nikolaev & Salahodjaev, 2017;  Ang et al., 2018). I add further evidence to this literature 
by demonstrating that the disease environment matters for corrupt behaviour. Importantly, this 
research contributes to an emerging literature on the determinants of corruption as reviewed 
earlier. More specifically, this paper attempts to explain the uneven geographic distribution of 
corruption levels, which has been largely ignored when examining the causes of corruption.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
framework behind the reduced-form link between UV-R and the prevalence of corruption. 
Section 3 presents the model specification and data. In Section 4, I discuss cross-country 
evidence, followed by an individual-level analysis in Section 5. Next, Section 6 offers further 
evidence using provincial level data for China. The paper concludes by summarizing the main 




2. The economic argument 
A plausible argument for the reduced-form relationship between UV-R and corruption rests 
upon the disease channel that shapes the cross-country variation in work-life expectancy as a 
skilled worker. In particular, the prevalence of various kinds of eye disease is attributable to 
the intensity of UV-R as pointed out by many studies in the epidemiological literature (e.g., 
Dong et al., 2003;  Gallagher & Lee, 2006;  West, 2007;  Lucas et al., 2008;  Löfgren, 2017). 
The permanent threat of contracting eye diseases, including cataracts, is significantly 
associated with impaired vision and blindness across the world (Gallagher & Lee, 2006;  
Löfgren, 2017). Andersen et al. (2016) argue that the risk of eye diseases matters for the global 
pattern of expected work life as a skilled worker. The explanation for this holds that visual 
acuity is of paramount importance for skill-intensive jobs because these occupations critically 
require literacy. Furthermore, there appears a global pattern of the prevalence of eye diseases, 
caused by the level of UV-R (Andersen et al., 2016). Cataracts, for instance, are common 
among the elderly population in Western Europe, but they tend to appear significantly earlier 
in life in countries located near the equator. Using survey data, Andersen et al. (2016) 
demonstrate that the estimated loss of work-life expectancy, caused by UV-R, amounts to up 
to 14 years, a sizeable influence.  
It follows from the above line of reasoning that the intensity of UV-R is a major cause of 
eye diseases, which shortens work-life expectancy as a skilled worker. This mechanism offers 
several implications for cross-country differences in corruption levels. The incentives for 
engaging in corrupt practices critically depend on the duration of work-life expectancy. 
Specifically, officials are more likely to misappropriate public resources for private gain when 
their window of opportunity is short (Olson, 1991;  Campante et al., 2009). The threat of 
diseases, therefore, positively affects the frequency of corrupt behaviour via shortening the 
incumbents’ horizon. In contrast, officials face a significantly longer work-life expectancy in 
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low UV-R regions (Andersen et al., 2016). This reduces their likelihood of exploiting public 
funds by increasing the horizon over which incumbents’ employment gains are discounted. 
Examining regional-level corruption in Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2011) find that areas where 
mayors face a binding one-term limit suffer from significantly higher corruption than ones 
where mayors are eligible for serving a second term. Accordingly, corrupt practices are 27% 
lower among mayors with re-election incentives. This result is consistent with the argument 
that the cross-country variation in the length of work-life expectancy, caused by UV-R related 
diseases, determines the motivation for abusing public resources for personal gain. I argue that 
this channel of influence helps explain the uneven distribution of corruption across the world. 
The reduced-form link between UV-R and corruption is consistent with the view that the 
disease environment helps shape long-term comparative institutional quality. An influential 
study by Acemoglu et al. (2001) contends that the prevalence of diseases determined the nature 
of European colonization, starting around the seventeenth century. For instance, inclusive 
institutions were established in areas where Europeans could easily settle because of a 
favourable disease environment. By contrast, extractive institutions were set up in places where 
a hostile disease environment made it difficult for European colonizers to settle permanently. 
The early institutions persist until today, thus shaping the path of development across the globe. 
Additionally, Ang et al. (2018) argue that the prevalence of eye diseases in some societies is 
detrimental to investment in cooperation by building institutions, leaving those countries with 
poorer institutional quality. Nikolaev and Salahodjaev (2017) find that the historical prevalence 
of infectious diseases helps shape the quality of economic institutions. Specifically, the 
pervasiveness of infectious diseases exerts a long-lasting effect on personality traits, cultural 
traits and regional-level morality, which ultimately determine the disparity in institutional 
quality. More recently, Vu (2019) documents a strong positive relationship between UV-R and 
the quality of institutions, measured by the Economic Freedom of the World index. Thus, the 
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disease environment matters for the frequency of corrupt practices because countries with bad 
institutions may lack efficient and transparent regulations to combat corruption (Dimant & 
Tosato, 2018).  
Andersen et al. (2016) demonstrate that the (historical) prevalence of eye diseases affects 
the perceived return to obtaining skills and knowledge across countries. This (early) persistent 
disparity negatively affects the availability of well-trained and competent bureaucrats who can 
design better rule of law to combat corruption. Importantly, the lack of incentives for skill 
accumulation also triggers inequality in power and wealth. It is plausible that powerful elites 
with superior skills and knowledge tend to emerge to manage a cadre of unskilled workers. 
Meanwhile, countries with a powerful elite group are usually more corrupt because they tend 
to exploit public resources for their own profits. A final reason works through the accumulation 
of food surpluses (Ang, 2013). Countries facing a permanent risk of developing eye diseases 
had lower (historical) motivation for investing in skills and technologies, which deterred the 
accumulation of food surplus (Andersen et al., 2016;  Ang et al., 2018). Early food surpluses 
induced the emergence of a  group of specialists who focused on designing rule of law, property 
rights and created the initial political structure of society (Diamond, 1997;  Ang, 2013). As 
argued by Acemoglu et al. (2001), these factors are persistent, shaping the pattern of 
comparative prosperity across the world. For this reason, I argue that they formed the 
fundamentals for tackling corruption in modern societies. 
In summary, this section proposes that there exists a positive reduced-form link between 
the intensity of UV-R and the level of corruption across countries. The central hypothesis of 
this study posits that high UV-R countries face a long-lasting threat of contracting eye diseases, 
thus having a shorter work-life expectancy than low UV-R regions. This pattern ultimately 
helps determine the geographic distribution of corrupt practices across the globe. The following 
sections empirically investigate this reduced-form relationship.  
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3. Models and data 
To explore a reduced-form relationship between the intensity of UV-R and corruption across 
countries, I employ the following basic econometric specification: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 log (𝑈𝑉)𝑖 + 𝛾 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where i denotes country i. 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the outcome variable, capturing the perceived level 
of corruption. 𝑈𝑉 is the main variable of interest, measuring the intensity of UV-R. 𝑋 stands 
for a vector of baseline control variables, including geographic endowments, legal origins, a 
communist dummy, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and religions. 𝜀 is the error term that 
includes unobserved country-specific factors. 𝛽 reflects the estimated effect of UV-R on 
corruption, and is expected to be positive.3  
Estimating the above equation requires some attention to omitted variable bias. This is 
because the nature of cross-sectional data does not allow us to control for unobserved country-
specific factors properly using fixed effects. To avoid such bias, this paper follows the long-
term comparative development literature to include an extensive set of confounding factors 
(Acemoglu, 2009, Ch. 4). It is also important to note that reverse causality is not a major 
concern in this context. Specifically, the level of UV-R can be affected by the ozone layer’s 
thickness, which may be partly influenced by economic development. Andersen et al. (2016), 
however, highlight that there appears no systematic evidence on the causal effect of economic 
activities in a specific region and its ozone layer.4 Thus, any reverse causation running from 
corruption to UV-R is even more tenuous.  
This study employs the World Bank’s reversed index of control of corruption in 2010 as 
the baseline dependent variable. For ease of interpretation, I multiply the original index by 
minus one so that higher values correspond to more intense corruption. Corrupt practices are 
                                                          
3
 I follow the logarithmic transformation of UV-R of Andersen et al. (2016). 
4
 Andersen et al. (2016) find that regional economic development exerts no direct influence on UV-R. This finding 
is presented in their online appendix Table A1.   
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generally hidden from official statistics, making it hard to measure corruption levels accurately. 
This raises a concern that the results may be spurious due to measurement error. Thus, 
alternative measures of corruption will be used in sensitivity analysis. The main variable of 
interest is the UV-R index, obtained from Andersen et al. (2016).5 This indicator is constructed 
using daily satellite-based data for ambient UV-R from NASA, measuring the intensity of 
radiation in a particular region on the earth. Thus, it reflects the extent to which people living 
in a specific area are exposed to sunburn caused by the intensity of UV-R. Andersen et al. 
(2016) employ highly disaggregated data at the pixel level to calculate the averaged index for 
each country for the years 1990 and 2000.6  
As argued above, I control for a number of potential confounders to isolate the causal 
effect of the UV-R on corruption. First, geographic endowments, including mean elevation, 
temperature and precipitation, are included as baseline controls because they may affect the 
intensity of UV-R. These factors may arguably influence corrupt behaviour via shaping 
motivation to work. Additional geographic characteristics will be used to rule out the 
possibility that a reduced-form link between UV-R and corruption is just a proxy for other 
geographic variables. Second, common-law countries have been shown to be less corrupt than 
civil-law counterparts (Treisman, 2000). Hence, legal origins are included, following the 
classification of Klerman et al. (2011).7  
Third, a dummy for being former socialist and transitional economies (communist) is 
included to account for the possibility that a socialist legacy is positively correlated with the 
incidence of corruption (La Porta et al., 1999;  Uberti, 2018). Fourth, ethnolinguistic diversity 
                                                          
5
 See also Andersen et al. (2016) for more details.  
6
 Cross-country differences in UV-R remains relatively constant over the last two billion years (Cockell & 
Horneck, 2001). This justifies the use of averaged data.   
7
 Klerman et al. (2011) define three legal codes including common, civil and mixed law. This is broadly similar 
to La Porta et al. (1999), except for a few countries that partly replaced their originally adopted French civil law 
by British common law. Civil-law countries are omitted as the base category.  
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may shape the social hierarchy via influencing cultural attitudes, thereby affecting the 
prevalence of corruption (Dimant & Tosato, 2018). I control for this effect by including the 
index of ethnic fractionalization of La Porta et al. (1999). Finally, I include regional dummies, 
following the World Bank’s geographic classification, to control for unobserved region-
specific factors. This is motivated by the observation that sub-Saharan African countries are 
among the most corrupt economies in the world while European countries enjoy significantly 
low levels of corruption. Furthermore, corruption may spread across countries located in the 
same region through sharing some common-culture values and economic interactions (Correa 
et al., 2016).8 The core results may reflect the effect of region-specific characteristics on 
corruption levels if we fail to include regional dummies. 
4. Cross-country evidence 
4.1. Main results 
Figure 2 illustrates the partial effect of UV-R on the incidence of corruption across 136 
countries after I control for all potential confounders discussed above. Accordingly, the 
intensity of UV-R is positively associated with corruption levels. This positive reduced-form 
relationship is consistent with the proposition discussed in Section 2 that high UV-R regions 
suffer from more intense corruption.  
Table 1 presents the OLS estimates of the effect of UV-R on corruption. The estimated 
coefficient of UV-R is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level when no control 
variables are included in the regression (column 1). The positive effect of UV-R on corruption 
levels remains precisely estimated when additional control variables are added to the 
regression. This suggests that the estimates in column (1) do not reflect a spurious relationship. 
The standardized beta coefficients are shown column (5) of Table 1. They indicate that UV-R 
                                                          
8
 This argument also suggests that the error term is spatially correlated. Hence, I will check whether the results 
are sensitive to this in Section 4.2.  
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exerts a larger effect on the level of corruption compared with any of the other baseline 
controls. This lends credence to the economic importance of UV-R in explaining cross-country 
differences in corrupt practices.  
 The estimated coefficients in column (4) of Table 1 suggest that a one percent increase 
in the UV-R index is associated with approximately a 0.016-unit increase in corruption, ceteris 
paribus. For instance, the values of UV-R of Denmark and Greece are about 56 and 134, 
respectively. The difference between these two countries is 78, roughly one standard deviation 
of UV-R. If Denmark instead experienced the level of UV-R of Greece, its corruption level 
would increase by approximately 2.23 units, ceteris paribus. This is a substantial effect. Taken 
together, I find strong evidence supporting the positive reduced-form link between the UV-R 
and the prevalence of corruption.   
4.2. Sensitivity analysis 
To rule out the possibility that the benchmark findings reflect a spurious relationship between 
UV-R and corruption, I perform a series of robustness tests. The set of baseline control 
variables and regional dummies remains unchanged throughout these sensitivity analyses. 
Controlling for the effect of historical confounders 
An influential view in the long-run comparative development literature holds that the 
early development of historical states and societies matters for today’s economic development. 
In particular, several studies demonstrate that the historical depth of experience with state 
institutions, measured by an index of state history, lies at the root of comparative prosperity 
across countries (Bockstette et al., 2002;  Ang, 2013;  Borcan et al., 2018). A recent study by 
Owen and Vu (2019) finds that there exists a non-linear relationship between measures of state 
history and corruption levels across the world. Accordingly, countries with medium statehood 
are among the least corrupt economies. In contrast, corrupt activities are more pervasive in 
nations either lacking or having excessive statehood experience. The core results in Table 1 
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may be biased if I fail to account for this hypothesis. For this reason, I control for the non-
linear effect of different measures of early development in Table 2. Accordingly, the estimated 
effect of UV-R on corruption remains largely similar to the baseline estimates in column (4) of 
Table 1. 
Another concern relates to the effect of (historical) migration flows. One may argue that 
the baseline results just reflect the persistent effect of the pattern of European settlement across 
countries (Acemoglu et al., 2001). This historical event led to the emergence of the global 
income differences by affecting the early institutional quality established during the 
colonization period. An additional basic argument holds that people brought with them 
institutions and regulations developed in their home countries when migrating. It is also 
plausible that people could choose to migrate to areas with low UV-R where the disease 
environment is less hostile. The core results, therefore, may merely reflect the long-lasting 
impact of migration flows throughout history on today’s corruption levels. To address this 
concern, I restrict the sample size to countries where the proportion of indigenous population 
(as of 1500) in the current population is greater than 70%, 80%, 90% and 95% (Table 3). Data 
are taken from the World Migration Matrix (Putterman & Weil, 2010). Results indicate that 
the reduced-form relationship between UV-R and corruption is statistically significant at the 
1% level when countries facing substantial inflows of immigrants since 1500 are excluded from 
the regression. 
Controlling for the effect of contemporary confounders 
Do the findings just reflect the impact of other contemporary determinants of corruption? 
Our understanding of cross-country differences in corrupt practices has mainly relied on some 
“proximate” factors, including income levels (Serra, 2006;  Aidt et al., 2008), natural resource 
endowments (Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010), trade openness (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000;  
Neeman et al., 2008), the size of government (Goel & Nelson, 1998, 2010), democracy 
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(Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010), education (Glaeser & Saks, 2006), urbanization (Goel & 
Nelson, 2010), and gender (Swamy et al., 2001).9 As argued above, it is hard to draw valid 
statistical inference on the causal effect of these factors on corruption mainly because of the 
issue of reverse causation. Furthermore, these proximate factors are jointly determined and 
interrelated with corruption, which necessitates understanding deeper or more fundamental 
roots of corrupt behaviour.10 Hence, they are not included as baseline controls. To address a 
concern that this may bias the benchmark results, I use them as additional controls in Table 4.11 
All variables are averaged across the preceding decade (2000-2009) to mitigate any reverse 
causality bias. Including these variables, however, does not alter the results. This suggests that 
the baseline findings are insensitive to controlling for a number of proximate determinants of 
corruption. Importantly, even if the estimated coefficients of UV-R were to become statistically 
insignificant when I control for these factors, this would provide insights into channels 
explaining the reduced-form link between UV-R and corruption. 
Controlling for spatial dependence 
A third concern is that corruption may transcend across borders. Countries located in 
high corruption areas tend to experience a greater frequency of corrupt practices (Correa et al., 
2016). The explanation for this rests on the premise that corrupt behaviour may be transmitted 
through economic interactions, cultural, institutional and other geographic factors. If this 
assumption is true, the OLS estimates could yield a spurious relationship between UV-R and 
corruption. To address this concern, I replicate the baseline estimates, using Conley’s (1999) 
spatial corrected standard errors (Table 5). This method has been widely applied in the 
comparative development literature (e.g., Ashraf & Galor, 2013;  Borcan et al., 2018). Results 
                                                          
9
 Dimant and Tosato (2018) provide an excellent review of causes and effects of corruption across countries.  
10
 Using these variables to explain corruption levels induces the additional question about what further explains 
the cross-country variation in these proximate determinants. For this reason, it is necessary to understand what 
determined corruption in the first place.  
11
 See the online appendix for variables’ description.  
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indicate that the effect of UV-R on corruption levels remains precisely estimated even if I rule 
out the potential bias of spatial dependence. Specifically, the standard errors that correct for 
the residual interdependence are much smaller than conventional robust standard errors. This 
suggests that inference on the reduced-form relationship between UV-R and corruption is not 
affected by spatial autocorrelation.   
Other robustness tests 
The results of additional sensitivity checks are provided in the online appendix. First, I 
test whether the baseline results are driven by using the World Bank’s reversed index of 
corruption in 2010 as the main dependent variable. To this end, I use the World Bank’s index 
measured at different periods and the Transparency International’s corruption perception index 
(Table A2).12 The results are broadly similar to those in column (4) of Table 1. Second, I control 
for additional geographic endowments, including absolute latitude, land suitability, the fraction 
of today’s population at risk of contracting malaria and a dummy for being landlocked (Table 
A3). The effect of UV-R on corruption remains precisely estimated if these variables are added. 
Finally, Figure 1 shows a strong effect of UV-R on corruption, but some outliers may arguably 
confound the baseline inference. Motivated by this concern, I perform a final sensitivity test by 
excluding some outliers in Table A4. I remove countries of which the Cook’s distance is larger 
than the rule-of-thumb value (four divided by the number of observations). Next, I identify a 
country as an outlier if the absolute value of its standardized residual is bigger than 1.96, thus 
being excluded in the regression. I further estimate robust regression weights, following Li 
(1985). These weights are employed to re-estimate the baseline model. Accordingly, the core 
findings remain largely unchanged when I control for the effect of outliers.  
  
                                                          
12
 The ICRG’s index of corruption reflects investment risks associated with corrupt practices but not the 
prevalence of corruption per se. For this reason, I do not use this index as a dependent variable.  
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4.3. A mechanism analysis 
In Section 2, I propose a reduced-form relationship between UV-R and corruption working 
through the disease channel. Accordingly, the permanent risk of contracting eye diseases, 
particularly cataracts, shortens the expected work life in high UV-R regions. This increases the 
prevalence of corrupt behaviour by reducing incumbents’ horizons. This sub-section estimates 
an IV regression to test this channel of influence. The log of UV-R is employed as an instrument 
for eye disease (cataracts).13 To be a valid instrument for eye disease, the hypothesized channel 
of influence, UV-R needs to satisfy the exclusion restriction. This requires that UV-R affect 
corruption only indirectly through the prevalence of eye disease. This is consistent with the 
proposed reduced-form argument discussed earlier. Indeed, it is difficult to envisage another 
channel of influence. Furthermore, the intensity of UV-R should be highly correlated with the 
incidence of eyes disease across countries, which justifies the assumption of a strong 
instrument (Andersen et al., 2016).  
Table 6 presents the IV-2SLS estimates. Accordingly, the estimated effect of UV-R on 
eye diseases in the first-stage regression is statistically significant at the 1% level (Panel A). 
This suggests that the UV-R is not a weak instrument for eye diseases, which is consistent with 
the findings of Andersen et al. (2016).14 Additionally, I present the value of F-statistics of 
excluded instruments and the weak identification test, following Anderson and Rubin (1949), 
Cragg and Donald (1993), and Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016). The results are larger than 
the conventionally accepted value of 10, which implies that UV-R is not a weak instrument. 
Turning to the second-stage regression, the estimated coefficients of cataracts are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that areas facing a higher risk of 
                                                          
13
 I use cataracts which are the most common eye disease, following Andersen et al. (2016). See also the online 
appendix.  
14
 Andersen et al. (2016) find a strong and robust effect of the log of UV-R on the prevalence of cataracts across 
countries. This suggests that UV-R is a strong instrument for cataracts.  
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contracting cataracts suffer from more intense corruption. The results lend strong empirical 
support to the proposed channel of influence presented in Section 2. 
5. Individual-level evidence 
Although I attempt to control for a number of confounding factors to minimize the potential 
omitted variable bias, there may exist some unobserved country-specific factors that this paper 
may fail to account for properly. To address this concern, I employ individual-level data, 
obtained from the World Values Survey wave 6. This survey is conducted in more than sixty 
countries through face-to-face interviews. Yet this survey does not include a separate theme 
for corruption. Fortunately, there is one relevant question about individuals’ attitudes towards 
corrupt acts in wave 6. In particular, respondents are asked about the extent to which they think 
corrupt practices are justifiable. The answers take ordinal values ranging from one to ten where 
higher values correspond to high corruption. It is plausible that countries where most people 
think giving a bribe is justifiable should experience a high level of corruption. Hence, I use this 
ordinal variable as the dependent variable measuring the prevalence of corruption.15   
The intensity of UV-R, measured at the regional level, is merged with survey data based 
on respondents’ answers about regions in which they are living. The set of geographic controls 
includes absolute latitude, mean elevation, precipitation, and temperature. These regional-level 
variables are obtained from Andersen et al. (2016). I control for a number of individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, income, educational attainment and social trust. 
Unobserved country-specific characteristics are removed using country fixed effects. Language 
dummies are included to account for unobserved individual-specific factors because people 
speaking a common language may share similar attitudes toward corrupt behaviour. Results in 
Table 7 suggest that respondents living in high UV-R regions are more likely to self-report that 
                                                          
15
 I drop observations with responses coded as “don’t know” or “no answer”. Variables’ descriptions are explained 
in the online appendix.  
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corrupt practices are justifiable. This is in line with cross-country evidence that the intensity of 
UV-R exerts a positive influence on the incidence of corruption. The finding is also robust to 
the choice of estimators and controlling for a number of confounding factors.16 
The World Values Survey wave 6 also provides some additional questions that are 
directly related to the perceived level of corruption. For instance, respondents are asked about 
the extent to which they think corruption is pervasive within businesses and the government, 
the perceived changes in corruption levels compared with five years ago, and the government’s 
efforts to reduce corrupt activities. Unfortunately, these questions contain many missing 
values. Using them as the dependent variable, therefore, imposes a major constraint on the 
country coverage.17 Importantly, the individual-level evidence remains largely unchanged 
when using these alternative dependent variables.18 This provide additional evidence 
supporting a positive link between UV-R and corruption levels.   
6. Within-country evidence 
This section further examines the effect of UV-R on corruption across 31 provinces in China. 
The main limitation of a cross-country analysis is that we may not fully control for country-
specific factors. For this reason, we can explore the effect of UV-R on the prevalence of corrupt 
activities across regions in China, holding institutional characteristics and other potential 
confounders constant. There exists an uneven distribution of the prevalence of corruption 
across regions in China, making it an interesting case to examine the reduced-form relationship 
between UV-R and corruption.  
To my knowledge, there are no surveys or province-level data on corruption in China. 
Thus, I employ the government efficiency index of Tang et al. (2014) as an indirect measure 
                                                          
16
 According to ordered logit estimates in Table 7, the estimated coefficients of UV-R are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Results remain largely unchanged when I estimate OLS regressions (Table 7). 
17
 Because of a limited country coverage, the findings may not be generalized to obtain a broad understanding of 
the link between UV-R and corruption.  
18
 Results are presented in the online appendix Table A5.  
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of control of corruption. This index captures the extent to which the provincial government can 
efficiently provide public services, and reflects the transparency of public affairs. It is plausible 
that an efficient government is less likely to misuse public resources for private gain. 
Additionally, the ability to combat corruption critically depends on how efficient, transparent 
and accountable the government is. Hence, this index provides a measure of the institutional 
environment and a proxy for regional-level corruption in China. I assume that regions in which 
the government is less efficient are more corrupt. 
I use three controls including trade openness, ethnic fractionalization, and a coastal 
dummy.19 It is important to highlight that data limitations do not allow for replicating all the 
control variables in the cross-country models. Furthermore, including many controls imposes 
further constraints on the feasible degree of freedom given the limited number of observations. 
Estimation results in the online appendix Table A6 show that UV-R is negatively correlated 
with the government efficiency. This suggests that high UV-R regions have a more inefficient 
government, ceteris paribus. These findings are consistent with the cross-country evidence.   
7. Conclusion 
An important viewpoint in the long-term comparative development literature attributes 
disparity in the global wealth to geographic endowments (Gallup et al., 1999;  Sachs, 2003). It 
is commonly observed that countries located near the equator suffer from underdevelopment 
while prosperity generally proliferates in societies lying further away from the equator. 
Andersen et al. (2016) recently provide an explanation for this long-standing fact. They find 
that UV-R helps explain income differences across the world. This paper adds to this strand of 
literature by proposing a novel hypothesis that UV-R also matters the prevalence of corrupt 
activities. By doing so, this study aims to improve our understanding of the deep roots of cross-
country differences in corruption levels. 
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 See the online appendix.   
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The central idea of this paper rests on the premise that the permanent threat of contracting 
eye diseases, caused by high UV-R, significantly shortens work-life expectancy as a skilled 
worker. I argue that this detrimental effect of sunlight exerts an influence on incumbents’ 
horizons. This helps explain the persistent divergence corrupt practices across the world. The 
prevalence of diseases also affects (historical) motivation for accumulating knowledge, skills 
and technologies, resulting in fewer competent and well-trained bureaucrats. I contend that 
these individuals are of great importance in designing good rule of law and regulations, which 
is arguably essential for combating modern-day corruption. The results, based on estimating 
cross-sectional data for up to 139 countries, lend strong credence to these arguments. 
Additionally, the baseline estimates are largely robust to performing a number of sensitivity 
tests. This suggests that the positive reduced-form relationship between UV-R and corruption 
is not spurious. Further analyses, drawn from estimating individual-level and within-country 
data, lend empirical support to the cross-country evidence.  
Overall, this study suggests that the intensity of UV-R has a strong and robust reduced-
form effect on the incidence of corruption. This link can be explained by the disease channel 
for various reasons discussed earlier. It is important to note that this paper by no means implies 
that the prevalence of corruption can be fully attributable to UV-R. Instead, the major objective 
this work is to advance our understanding of the deep roots of corrupt activities. Eliminating 
corrupt practices appears to be elusive. Understanding the origins of corruption, therefore, is 
the first step toward curbing corruption. 
To conclude, corruption is a global concern that poses a great challenge toward fulfilling 
the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. The global disparities in corruption levels are large 
and persistent. This paper argue that corruption is deeply rooted in geographic conditions, 
particularly the intensity of UV-R. My findings, therefore, demonstrate the importance of 
geography on the persistent nature of corrupt acts. It is hoped that these findings will induce 
20 
 
further discussion on the link between geography, diseases, and corrupt behaviour at both the 
macro- and micro-level. 
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Figure 1. Geographic distribution of corruption levels 
Notes: This figure illustrates cross-country differnces in the perceived level of corruption, using 
the World Bank’s reversed index of control of corruption. Accordingly, darker regions with 
higher values of the reversed index face a higher frequency of corrupt acts. 
 
 




Table 1. Main results 
 























Dependent variable: the World Bank’s reversed index of control of corruption 
          
Log (UV)  1.162***  1.317**  1.251***  1.589***  0.827*** 
 [0.142]  [0.657]  [0.357]  [0.462]  [0.462] 
Mean elevation    0.020  -0.005  -0.203  -0.114 
   [0.289]  [0.168]  [0.172]  [0.172] 
Temperature   -0.002  0.007  -0.026  -0.221 
   [0.044]  [0.027]  [0.030]  [0.030] 
Precipitation    -0.033***  -0.005  0.014  0.082 
   [0.012]  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.013] 
Common law     -0.407**  -0.427***  -0.165*** 
     [0.170]  [0.143]  [0.143] 
Mixed law     -0.347*  -0.415*  -0.113* 
     [0.194]  [0.238]  [0.238] 
Communist      1.143***  1.355***  0.567*** 
     [0.163]  [0.186]  [0.186] 
Fractionalization     0.578**  0.624**  0.189** 
     [0.248]  [0.276]  [0.276] 
Catholic      -0.001  -0.001  -0.040 
     [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Muslim     0.006**  0.004*  0.144* 
     [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Protestant      -0.006*  -0.004  -0.082 
     [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
          
Region FE No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations 139  139  136  136  136 
R-squared 0.360  0.395  0.689  0.738  0.738 
Notes: Region FE denotes regional dummies, including Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America, South Asia, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. East Asian and Pacific countries are excluded as the base group. All 
regressions include an intercept, which is omitted for brevity. Robust standard errors in 





Table 2. Robustness to controlling for historical confounders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: the World Bank’s reversed index of control of corruption 
     
Log (UV) 1.448*** 1.534*** 1.795*** 1.630*** 
 [0.458] [0.487] [0.531] [0.470] 
State history -3.284**    
 [1.292]    
State history squared 4.226**    
 [1.697]    
Neolithic revolution  0.055   
  [0.138]   
Neolithic revolution squared  -0.002   
  [0.011]   
Human settlement    -0.846  
   [0.942]  
Human settlement squared   0.408  
   [0.645]  
Predicted genetic diversity    40.376 
    [51.246] 
Predicted genetic diversity squared    -20.057 
    [36.885] 
     
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.753 0.740 0.742 0.761 
Notes: State history reflects the experience with state institutions, calculated across six 
millennia from 3500BCE to 2000 by Borcan et al. (2018). Neolithic revolution reflects the 
length of time elapsed since a country experienced a transition to sedentary agriculture, 
obtained from Putterman (2006). Human settlement is the duration since the first human 
settlement, constructed by Ahlerup and Olsson (2012). The last control variable is the measure 
of genetic diversity of Ashraf and Galor (2013). Baseline controls are those included in column 









Indigenous people (as of 1500) 
as a percentage of current population 
 70%  80%  90%  95% 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable: the World Bank’s reversed index of control of corruption 
          
Log (UV) 1.589***  1.946***  2.004***  2.332***  2.517*** 
 [0.462]  [0.500]  [0.514]  [0.565]  [0.682] 
          
Baseline Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 136  98  91  73  57 
R-squared 0.738  0.797  0.805  0.830  0.819 
Notes: I replicate the baseline estimates in column (1) for the purpose of comparison. From 
columns (2) to (5), I gradually restrict the sample size to only countries whose current 
population includes 70%, 80%, 90% and 95% of indigenous population as of 1500. Robust 





Table 4. Robustness to controlling for contemporary confounders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable: the World Bank’s reversed index of control of corruption 
          
Log (UV) 1.404*** 1.259*** 1.642*** 1.473*** 1.381*** 1.621*** 1.523*** 1.502*** 0.810** 
 [0.437] [0.430] [0.469] [0.460] [0.420] [0.484] [0.422] [0.420] [0.357] 
Log (GDP per capita) -0.302***        -0.391*** 
 [0.068]        [0.096] 
Fuel exports  0.007***       0.012*** 
  [0.002]       [0.002] 
Trade openness   0.001      -0.000 
   [0.001]      [0.001] 
Government size    -0.038***     -0.013 
    [0.014]     [0.014] 
Democracy [polity2]     -0.035***    -0.013 
     [0.011]    [0.011] 
Education      -0.107***   0.006 
      [0.036]   [0.039] 
Urbanization        -1.144***  -0.325 
       [0.385]  [0.405] 
Gender         -0.017*** -0.016*** 
        [0.006] [0.006] 
          
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 135 129 134 132 129 120 136 135 108 
R-squared 0.783 0.760 0.738 0.760 0.768 0.765 0.759 0.761 0.877 
Notes: All variables are averaged across the period from 2000-2009 to minimize reverse causality. Variables’ descriptions are explained in the 
online appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Robustness to controlling for spatial dependence 
 (1) (3) (4)  
Dependent variable: The World Bank’s reversed index of control of corruption 
     
Log (UV-R)  1.162*** 1.251*** 1.589***  
 [0.142] [0.357] [0.462]  
Conley standard errors (0.039) (0.073) (0.074)  
     
     
Baseline Controls No Yes Yes  
Region FE No No Yes  
Observations 139 136 136  
R-squared 0.360 0.689 0.738  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in squared brackets. Conley’s (1999) standard errors that 
correct for spatial autocorrelation across countries are reported in parentheses. This is 
performed by calculating the weighted covariance matrices, where the weights correspond to 
the inverse of the distance between countries and equals zero after a specified threshold. 
Following Borcan et al. (2018), a threshold of twenty coordinate degrees is specified. 
Importantly, results are insensitive to the choice of different thresholds. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.  
Table 6. A mechanism analysis 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A. First-stage regression. Dependent variable: log of cataracts 
   
Log (UV-R) 2.361*** 1.189*** 
 [0.143] [0.332] 
Panel B. Second-stage regression. 
Dependent variable: the World Bank’s reversed index of control of corruption 
   
Log (Cataracts) 0.492*** 1.296*** 
 [0.053] [0.329] 
   
Baseline Controls No Yes 
Region FE No Yes 
Observations 139 136 
R-squared 0.445 0.328 
Diagnostic tests   
  F-test of excluded instruments 273.08 12.84 
  Cragg-Donald weak identification test 224.39 11.86 
  Anderson-Rubin Wald test 67.28 30.12 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 7. Individual-level analysis 
 
OLS estimates  Ordered logit estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: respondents’ attitude toward corrupt practices 
          
Log of UV-R 0.374*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.344***  0.424*** 0.293*** 0.262** 0.481*** 
 [0.013] [0.078] [0.080] [0.082]  [0.016] [0.100] [0.103] [0.108] 
Latitude   -0.017 -0.018 -0.012   0.078*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 
  [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]   [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] 
Mean elevation  -0.000 -0.000* 0.000***   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Precipitation   0.026 0.017 0.011   0.020 0.000 -0.048 
  [0.024] [0.025] [0.026]   [0.026] [0.027] [0.031] 
Temperature   0.005 0.004 -0.010*   0.005 0.004 0.011* 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]   [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] 
          
Language FE No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
Individual Controls No  No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.010 0.118 0.129 0.179  0.004 0.046 0.053 0.072 
Observations 83,103 83,103 78,320 75,906  83,103 83,103 78,320 75,906 
Number of countries 56 56 56 56  56 56 56 56 
Notes: Individual-level controls include age, gender, income levels, educational attainment, and social trust. The estimated coefficients of these 
individual-level control variables are statistically significant at the 1% level in all regressions, but they are omitted for brevity. Country dummies 
(country FE) and the intercept estimates are also omitted to conserve space. Language FE represents 227 binary variables for common language. 
The values of R-squared and Pseudo R-squared are reported for OLS estimates and ordered logit estimates, respectively. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX FOR 
“Climate, Diseases, and the Origins of Corruption” 
1. List of countries 
Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Burundi, 
Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei, Botswana, Central African Republic, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, 
China, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt Arab Republic, Spain, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, 
United Kingdom, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, The Gambia, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Honduras, Croatia, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Italy, Jordan, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, Republic of Korea, 
Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Latvia, Morocco, Moldova, 
Madagascar, Mexico, Macedonia, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, 
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Somalia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Chad, Togo, Thailand, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, United 
States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
2. Variables and data 
Cross-country data 
Control of corruption (CC): This indicator reflects perception about the extent to which public 
resources are misappropriated for private gains. The reversed index is calculated by multiplying 
by minus one and is used throughout the paper. Higher values correspond to more intense 
corruption. Source:  the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
Corruption perception index (CPI): This index measures the perceived level of corruption, 
with higher values denoting less corruption. Source: Transparency International 
(https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi).   
ii 
 
Log of ultraviolet radiation (log UV): This index reflects the strength of ultraviolet radiation 
across regions in the world. It is calculated using daily satellite-based data for ambient UV-R, 
obtained from NASA. Source: Andersen et al. (2016).  
Mean Elevation: This index measures a country’s mean elevation above the sea level (in 
kilometres). Source: Portland Physical Geography dataset. 
Temperature: The average monthly temperature from 1961 to 1990 (in degrees Celsius). 
Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013). 
Precipitation: The average monthly precipitation from 1961 to 1990 (in degrees centimetres). 
Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013). 
Legal origins: This is dummy variables for legal origins of Klerman et al. (2011). These include 
common law, civil law and mixed law. Civil law is removed as the base category.  
Communist: equals one if a country has a communist legacy and zero otherwise. This is 
identical to the socialist origin variable of La Porta et al. (1999). Source: La Porta et al. (1999).  
Fractionalization: this is a measure of ethnolinguistic diversity. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).  
Catholic: the proportion of Catholics in the population. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Muslim: the proportion of Muslims in the population. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Protestant: the proportion of Protestants in the population. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
State history: This index reflects the experience with state institutions, measured from 
3500BCE to 2000. Source: Borcan et al. (2018).  
Neolithic revolution: This index measures the length of time elapsed since the transition to 
sedentary agriculture 10000 years ago. Source: Putterman (2006). 
Human settlement: This index captures the length of time elapsed since the first human 
settlement. Source: Ahlerup and Olsson (2012). 
Predicted genetic diversity: This indicator reflects a country’s genetic diversity. Source: Ashraf 
and Galor (2013).  
GDP per capita: GDP per capita in 2010 USD constant prices, averaged from 2000 to 2009. 
Source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
Fuel exports: the value of fuel exports as a proportion of the total merchandise exports value, 
averaged from 2000 to 2009. Source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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Trade openness: the value of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, averaged from 2000 
to 2009. Source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Government size: the value of government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP, averaged from 2000 to 2009. Source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Democracy: the polity2 index of political institutions. Source: Marshall et al. (2014). 
Education: the index of years of schooling. Source: Barro and Lee (2013). 
Urbanization: urban population as a proportion of total population, averaged from 2000 to 
2009. Source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 Gender: the proportion of women in parliament, averaged from 2000 to 2009. Source: the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Cataracts: This index reflects the number years of healthy life lost due to the incidence of 
cataracts. Source: Andersen et al. (2016).  
Absolute latitude: This index capture a country’s absolute latitude (in 100s). Source: Portland 
Physical Geography dataset.  
Land suitability: This index measures land suitability for agriculture. Source: Michalopoulos 
(2012).  
Malaria: the proportion of the population at risk of contracting malaria. Source: Gallup and 
Sachs (2001).  
Landlocked: equals one if being surrounded by land and zero otherwise. Source: CIA World 
Fact Book.  
Individual-level data 
Dependent variable: question V202, the World Values Survey wave 6. This variable captures 
the extent to which respondents think giving a bribe is justifiable. Answers contain ordinal 
values, ranging from one to ten. Higher values correspond to more corruption.  
Individual controls include age, age squared (question V242), gender (question V240), income 
levels (question V239), educational attainment (question V248), and social trust (question 
V24), obtained from the World Values Survey wave 6.  Detailed information can be found in 
WVS wave 6’s codebook (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp).  
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Geographic controls include absolute latitude, mean elevation, precipitation, and temperature, 
which are similar to geographic variables in cross-country models. These variables are 
measured at the regional level. Source: Andersen et al. (2016). 
Within-country data 
 Log UV: the intensity of ultraviolet radiation across 31 provinces in China. Source: Andersen 
et al. (2016). 
Government efficiency index: this index reflects the efficiency of the provincial government’s 
provision of public services and infrastructure, and the transparency of public affairs, measured 
in 2010. Source: Tang et al. (2014).  
Trade openness: the value of exports and imports as a proportion of gross regional products in 
2010 for 31 provinces. The values of exports and imports are measured in USD. Gross regional 
product is measured in the Chinese yuan, and is converted into USD using the OCED’s 
exchange rate in 2010. Source: National Bureau Statistics of China 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/).  
Coastal dummy: equals zero if a province is surrounded by land and one otherwise. Source: 
author’s calculation.   
Ethnic fractionalization: this index reflects ethnic diversity across 31 provinces in China in 




Table A1. Summary statistics of cross-country data 
 N Mean Std Min Max 
The reversed index of control of corruption  158 0.13 1.03 -2.36 1.74 
Corruption perception index  157 41.99 19.84 0 90 
UV 139 191.09 78.59 42.66 328.53 
Log (UV) 139 5.14 0.52 3.75 5.79 
Mean elevation  149 0.64 0.55 0.01 3.19 
Temperature  158 18.23 8.35 -7.93 28.64 
Precipitation  158 9.29 6.17 0.29 25.99 
Common law  156 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Mixed law  156 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Communist 158 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Fractionalization  158 0.29 0.31 0 1 
Catholic 158 30.28 35.52 0 96.90 
Muslim 158 23.46 35.23 0 99.80 
Protestant 158 11.47 20.31 0 97.80 
State history 159 0.23 0.17 0.02 0.74 
Neolithic revolution 151 4.72 2.44 0.36 10.50 
Human settlement  158 0.59 0.49 0.002 1.6 
Predicted genetic diversity  158 0.71 0.05 0.57 0.77 
GDP per capita (log) 154 8.27 1.53 5.42 11.37 
Fuel exports 146 17.78 28.25 0 97.36 
Trade openness  151 84.28 47.53 0.44 391.67 
Government size  147   15.63 5.79 4.84 37.98 
Democracy 145 3.96 6.03 -10 10 
Education  132 8.25 2.88 1.87 13.18 
Urbanization  157 0.54 0.22 0.09 1 
Gender 154 15.82 9.26 0 45.40 
Cataracts (log) 139 5.06 1.56 2.12 6.85 
Absolute latitude  159 0.26 0.17 0.004 0.67 
Land suitability  145 0.37 0.24 0 0.96 
Malaria  151 0.31 0.42 0 1 





3. Additional sensitivity tests 
Table A2. Robustness to using other measures of corruption 
Dependent 
variable 


















perception index  
       
Log (UV) 1.589*** 1.589*** 1.568*** 2.080***  0.688*** 
 [0.462] [0.448] [0.432] [0.436]  [0.241] 
       
Observations 136 135 135 136  136 
R-squared 0.738 0.754 0.757 0.715  0.604 
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table A3. Robustness to controlling for additional geographic endowments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: the World Bank’s reversed index of control of corruption 
      
Log (UV) 1.221** 1.574*** 1.567*** 1.731*** 1.097* 
 [0.554] [0.477] [0.437] [0.451] [0.568] 
Absolute latitude  -1.914    -3.404** 
 [1.496]    [1.477] 
Land suitability   0.183   0.290 
  [0.293]   [0.309] 
Malaria    0.591**  0.338 
   [0.246]  [0.247] 
Landlocked     0.010 0.039 
    [0.130] [0.128] 
      
Observations 136 136 136 125 125 
R-squared 0.742 0.739 0.750 0.770 0.783 
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table A4. Robustness to excluding outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: the World Bank’s reversed index of control of corruption 
    
Log (UV) 1.590*** 1.310*** 1.505*** 
 [0.372] [0.385] [0.361] 
Mean elevation -0.227 -0.142 -0.190 
 [0.151] [0.140] [0.132] 
Temperature -0.029 -0.025 -0.038 
 [0.026] [0.024] [0.023] 
Precipitation  0.003 0.011 0.014 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] 
Common law -0.283** -0.402*** -0.412*** 
 [0.134] [0.134] [0.126] 
Mixed law -0.373** -0.659*** -0.497** 
 [0.182] [0.214] [0.203] 
Communist 1.164*** 1.247*** 1.272*** 
 [0.157] [0.157] [0.152] 
Fractionalization  0.407* 0.349 0.442* 
 [0.240] [0.254] [0.232] 
Catholic  -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Muslim  0.003 0.004* 0.004** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Protestant -0.007** -0.009*** -0.007** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
    
Observations 121 128 136 
R-squared 0.796 0.816 0.796 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table replicate the baseline regressions by excluding some influential observations. 
In column (1), outliers are identified by calculating the Cook’s distance. Accordingly, counties 
of which the value is bigger than four divided by the number of observations are removed from 
the regression. Next, I calculate the standardized residual and exclude countries whose absolute 
value is greater than 1.96 (column 2). Finally, I estimate robust regression weights, which are 
used to re-estimate the baseline model. In all cases, the core results appear to be highly robust. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A5. Individual-level analysis 
 
OLS estimates  Ordered logit estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable bus_pci gov_pci delta_pci eff_pci  bus_pci gov_pci delta_pci eff_pci 
          
Log (UV) 4.890*** 0.984 2.112* 1.245***  4.153*** 1.738** 2.246*** 3.594*** 
 [1.030] [0.977] [1.080] [0.295]  [0.831] [0.820] [0.800] [0.874] 
Absolute latitude 1.946** -1.453** -1.019 0.343  1.127* -0.940* -0.749 1.058 
 [0.762] [0.601] [0.762] [0.219]  [0.592] [0.530] [0.581] [0.671] 
Elevation  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.001*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Precipitation  -0.735*** -0.509*** 0.045 -0.120**  -0.517*** -0.365** 0.033 -0.392** 
 [0.193] [0.189] [0.202] [0.057]  [0.156] [0.150] [0.146] [0.168] 
Temperature -0.054* -0.011 0.007 -0.006  -0.051** -0.029 -0.010 -0.016 
 [0.029] [0.030] [0.031] [0.009]  [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] 
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000  -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Male 0.033 0.061 -0.034 0.059***  0.027 0.051 -0.021 0.164*** 
 [0.051] [0.051] [0.055] [0.015]  [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.043] 
Income -0.024* -0.007 0.021 -0.016***  -0.028** -0.019* 0.004 -0.050*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.004]  [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
Education  0.041*** 0.042*** 0.004 0.014***  0.033*** 0.036*** 0.005 0.041*** 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.003]  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] 
Trust -0.203*** -0.294*** -0.251*** -0.135***  -0.176*** -0.213*** -0.183*** -0.381*** 
 [0.060] [0.061] [0.065] [0.019]  [0.045] [0.046] [0.047] [0.053] 
          
Observations 8,094 8,101 8,089 8,079  8,094 8,101 8,089 8,079 
R-squared 0.088 0.095 0.083 0.091  0.023 0.025 0.021 0.048 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Dependent variables are different measures of respondents’ perceived level of corruption, obtained from the World Values Survey: (1) buss_pci 
(the extent to which corruption is widespread within businesses); (2) gov_pci (the extent to which corruption is widespread within the government); (3) 
delta_pci (the perceived changes in the level of corruption compared with 5 years ago); (4) eff_pci (the government’s efforts to combat corruption). 
Higher values mean more corruption. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A6. Within-country analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: government efficiency index 
     
Log (UV) -0.369*** -0.328*** -0.364*** -0.354** 
 [0.118] [0.107] [0.130] [0.170] 
Integration (trade)  0.462*** 0.349*** 0.346*** 
  [0.083] [0.064] [0.064] 
Coastal dummy   0.184** 0.183** 
   [0.080] [0.083] 
Ethnic fractionalization    -0.020 
    [0.287] 
     
Observations 31 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.105 0.467 0.533 0.533 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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